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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule emerged on the 
scene roughly a century ago,1 judges and scholars of formidable intelli-
 
∗ Professor of Law and Bouma Fellow in Trial Law, University of Iowa College of Law. 
 1. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“If letters and private docu-
ments can . . . be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an of-
fense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value, and, so far as those thus 
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”); see also Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-33 (1886) (giving early life to the possibility of an exclu-
sionary rule by suggesting that using a defendant’s illegally seized documents in a criminal 
prosecution is tantamount to forcing the defendant to testify against himself or herself in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment).  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
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gence and towering reputations have disagreed about the rule’s merits.  
Prior generations found Justice Potter Stewart declaring, for example, that 
“the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence”2 is the only effective means 
of “ensur[ing] that the government does not violate the fourth amendment 
at its pleasure,”3 while Judge Benjamin Cardozo condemned the notion that 
“[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”4 Today, 
Wayne LaFave painstakingly defends the exclusionary rule5 and calls the 
Fourth Amendment his “cheval de bataille,”6 while Akhil Amar insists that 
“[t]he exclusionary rule renders the Fourth Amendment contemptible in the 
eyes of judges and citizens.”7  The core reasons for the rule’s divisiveness 
are not difficult to perceive.  Without the exclusionary rule or any other de-
terrence mechanism, one can reasonably fear that government officials will 
sometimes behave like totalitarian bullies, brazenly disregarding the Fourth 
Amendment’s demands and securing criminal convictions on the strength 
of illegally obtained evidence.  With the exclusionary rule, one can reason-
ably fear that guilty and possibly dangerous individuals will sometimes be 
released due to seemingly technical Fourth Amendment violations, thereby 
frustrating many citizens’ conceptions of justice and good sense. 
Both of these countervailing fears have powerfully influenced the Su-
preme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  With respect to the fear 
of totalitarian behavior, the exclusionary rule traces its birth to cases in 
which government officials evinced no regard whatsoever for citizens’ 
Fourth Amendment rights.  In the landmark case of Weeks v. United 
States,8 for example, state and federal law enforcement officers searched 
the defendant’s home without a warrant and seized numerous items of evi-
dence while the defendant was away, after a neighbor showed the police 
where a key to the defendant’s residence was hidden.9  In Silverthorne 
 
 2. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development 
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 
1389 (1983). 
 3. Id. at 1384. 
 4. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
 5. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.2 (4th ed. 2004). 
 6. Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest 
Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 757 (2009). 
 7. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 
(1994). 
 8. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 9. See id. at 386-87; see also id. at 392 (“The tendency of those who execute the crimi-
nal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . . should find 
no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of 
the Constitution . . . .”). 
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Lumber Co. v. United States,10 federal officials entered the defendant’s of-
fice “without a shadow of authority . . . and made a clean sweep of all the 
books, papers and documents found there.”11  In Agnello v. United States,12 
one group of federal officials took the defendant to the local police station 
while another group simultaneously searched the defendant’s home without 
a warrant and seized incriminating evidence.13  In Mapp v. Ohio,14 police 
officers forced their way into the defendant’s residence, physically re-
strained the defendant, and searched the defendant’s residence without a 
warrant, all despite the defendant’s vociferous objections.15  The Court 
created the exclusionary rule with the hope that, stripped of the incentive to 
obtain evidence illegally for use in criminal prosecutions, law enforcement 
officers would not commit such abuses again.16 
With respect to the fear that guilty and possibly dangerous defendants 
will escape punishment due to non-egregious violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court has identified numerous occasions when the exclu-
sionary rule need not be applied.  In United States v. Leon,17 for example, 
the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not “bar the use in the prose-
cution’s case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate 
but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.”18  The Court 
found that applying the exclusionary rule in such cases would provoke 
“‘disrespect for the law and administration of justice.’”19  In Illinois v. 
Krull,20 the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when an 
officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute that is later 
held unconstitutional.21 For the officer who is complying with a statute in 
an objectively reasonable manner, the Court found, the exclusionary rule is 
 
 10. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
 11. Id. at 390; see also id. at 392 (stating that admitting the illegally seized evidence 
would “reduce[] the Fourth Amendment to a form of words”). 
 12. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
 13. See id. at 29; see also id. at 32 (“The search of a private dwelling without a warrant 
is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws.”). 
 14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 15. See id. at 644. 
 16. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“The purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is . . . to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guaran-
tee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”). 
 17. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 18. Id. at 900. 
 19. Id. at 908 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976)). 
 20. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
 21. See id. at 349-50. 
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likely to have “little deterrent effect.”22  In Hudson v. Michigan,23 the Court 
held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the police arrive at a 
residence to execute a search warrant but enter the residence before giving 
the defendant adequate time to answer the officers’ knock on the door.24  
To apply the exclusionary rule on these facts, the Court concluded, “would 
be forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal 
regime that existed almost half a century ago.”25  Most recently, in Herring 
v. United States,26 the Court held that the exclusionary rule may not apply 
when “an officer reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant 
[and accordingly arrests the suspect and conducts a search incident to ar-
rest], but that belief turns out to be wrong because of a negligent bookkeep-
ing error by another police employee[.]”27 
These two fears—the fear of totalitarian behavior by law enforcement 
officials and the fear of releasing guilty and perhaps dangerous defen-
dants—weigh especially heavily on the judge who must decide whether the 
exclusionary rule applies in a given case.  As Justice Stewart acknowledged 
on behalf of the Court in Elkins v. United States,28 judges have no desire to 
“be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are 
sworn to uphold.”29  The power to exclude illegally obtained evidence thus 
enables judges to maintain a sense of “judicial integrity.”30  Yet a judge’s 
sense of integrity can sometimes be strained by the exclusionary rule itself.  
As Judge Henry Friendly observed, judges take no pleasure in “per-
form[ing] the distasteful duty of allowing a dangerous criminal to go free 
because of a slight and unintentional miscalculation by the police.”31  No 
judge takes satisfaction in associating himself or herself with (as Professor 
Amar puts it) “grinning criminals getting off on crummy technicalities,”32 
 
 22. See id. at 349. 
 23. 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 24. See id. at 599 (“Resort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt [on 
these facts] is unjustified.”); see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (“[W]e 
hold that in some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 25. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597. 
 26. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 27. Id. at 698. 
 28. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
 29. Id. at 223. 
 30. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (reiterating Justice Stewart’s observation in 
Elkins and stating that the exclusionary rule is vital to “judicial integrity”). 
 31. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. 
REV. 929, 953 (1965). 
 32. See Amar, supra note 7, at 799 (“In the popular mind, the Amendment has lost its 
luster and become associated with grinning criminals getting off on crummy technicali-
ties.”). 
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nor does any judge want to be part of the story that is told when a defen-
dant who benefits from the suppression of incriminating evidence commits 
terrible crimes after he or she has been released. 
The most personally wrenching Fourth Amendment cases for judges 
might be those that fall somewhere between two extremes—cases in which 
law enforcement officers’ conduct is not as egregious as the conduct that 
prompted the Court to create the exclusionary rule in the first place, yet not 
so innocent (or otherwise removed from the rule’s core objectives) as to 
fall within any of the rule’s available exceptions.  Unless a judge believes 
that such a case falls beyond the reach of Supreme Court precedent, he or 
she presumably will apply the rule and suppress the illegally obtained evi-
dence.  Yet the judge might anguish about whether he or she is truly doing 
justice, in the broadest sense of the term. 
There are at least two ways in which our legal system offers solace to 
judges who feel misgivings when they suppress incriminating evidence 
pursuant to the exclusionary rule.  The first involves what James Whitman, 
in a different context, calls “agency denial”—the notion that, when the 
judge carefully obeys the law’s substantive and procedural demands, “it [is] 
the law that [makes] the decision, not the judge.”33  Professor Whitman 
credits Saint Augustine and Saint Jerome with proposing this conception of 
judges as mere “ministers of the law” in the fifth century;34 he finds this 
conception reiterated by Gratian in the twelfth century35 and argues that it 
provided one of the chief ways in which medieval judges learned to deflect 
moral responsibility for their actions.36  Agency denial can play a role to-
day when judges feel qualms about applying the exclusionary rule.  In 
1961, for example, when the Supreme Court announced that state judges 
were just as obliged as their federal counterparts to apply the exclusionary 
rule when law enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court offered state judges a version of Augustine’s and Jerome’s ancient 
assurance: “The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him 
free.”37 
The second source of solace for judges who are troubled by their appli-
cations of the exclusionary rule lies in the subject of this Article: the work 
performed by jurors.  Scholars and judges have long recognized that, when 
 
 33. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF 
THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 17 (2008). 
 34. See id. at 38-40. 
 35. See id. at 17. 
 36. See id. at 17-18, 40.  Whitman argues that, during these periods, agency denial pro-
vided a means by which Christian judges could alleviate their fear that they would imperil 
their own eternal fate if they mistakenly convicted an innocent defendant. See id. at 16-17. 
 37. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). 
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a judge shares the stage with a jury, the judge diffuses the responsibility 
that he or she must bear for unpopular outcomes.38  In the sixteenth cen-
tury, for example, Sir Thomas More and others observed that “judges 
sought refuge from the . . . agonies of decision by . . . refusing to meddle 
with questions of fact” and by placing those factual questions in the hands 
of jurors.39  James Stephen similarly noted in the late nineteenth century 
that trial by jury “saves judges from the responsibility—which to many 
men would appear intolerably heavy and painful—of deciding simply on 
their own opinion upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner.”40  That 
sense of shared responsibility confers benefits upon a judge when he or she 
suppresses illegally obtained yet damning evidence of the defendant’s guilt 
and the defendant is ultimately acquitted by a jury.  Although the judge is, 
of course, the one who made the crucial evidentiary ruling, a portion of the 
public’s ire can be directed to the jurors for failing to sniff out the defen-
dant’s apparent guilt on the strength of the evidence that was presented to 
them.41 
When we look at applications of the exclusionary rule from the jurors’ 
point of view, however, we see a very different picture.  Unlike a trial 
judge who has willingly entered a profession in which he or she must im-
plement the rules that the Supreme Court has crafted, who has been ap-
prised of the nature of the illegally seized evidence proffered in a given 
case, and who has chosen either to disregard that evidence in a bench trial 
or to withhold that evidence from the jurors in a jury trial, jurors are in a 
position of relative ignorance and powerlessness.  They might be participat-
ing in the trial against their will, they might be staunchly opposed to the no-
tion of acquitting guilty defendants in order to deter future unlawful beha-
 
 38. See WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 16-17. 
 39. 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 43 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978); see also id. at 138 
(“No doubt judges could exert influence on a jury, but the forms of charge and oath made it 
plain that the ultimate responsibility for a conviction rested on the jurors’ consciences.”); 
Thomas P. Gallanis, Reasonable Doubt and the History of the Criminal Trial, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 941, 953 (2009) (book review) (citing SPELMAN, supra).  Judges’ predilections 
changed as time wore on.  John Langbein finds that judges in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries “did not regard the jury as an autonomous fact-finder” and often did not 
hesitate to tell jurors how they ought to rule. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before 
the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 285 (1978).  As the eighteenth century progressed and 
attorneys became the central players in courtroom proceedings, however, judges greatly cur-
tailed their efforts to influence juries. See id. at 314. 
 40. WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 16-17 (quoting 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 573 (1883)). 
 41. Jurors, in turn, can employ the same agency-denial strategy that is available to 
judges, by telling themselves and others that it is the law, not the jury, that is to be blamed 
for unpopular outcomes. See id. at 17-18 (noting an example of agency denial by jurors in 
the seventeenth century). 
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vior by law enforcement officials, they likely have no inkling that the ille-
gally seized evidence in the case before them even exists, and they play no 
role in shaping the body of evidence on which they must base their verdict.  
I will argue that—taken as a whole—these are morally significant differ-
ences, and that the application of the exclusionary rule in jury trials raises 
troubling moral issues that are not present when a judge adjudicates a case 
on his or her own.  Specifically, I will argue that (1) courts infringe on ju-
rors’ deliberative autonomy in a morally problematic way whenever they 
refuse to admit evidence that is both relevant and reasonably available;42 
(2) this infringement is especially problematic in the Fourth Amendment 
setting;43 and (3) although there are several ways in which these moral 
problems could be at least partially mitigated,44 the best approach might be 
to abandon the exclusionary rule entirely.45 
I.  JURORS’ DELIBERATIVE AUTONOMY 
Withholding relevant, reasonably available evidence from jurors is al-
ways morally problematic.  Those moral difficulties are especially trouble-
some when the evidence is withheld pursuant to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. 
A. The Moral Problem with Exclusionary Rules 
Exclusionary rules of all sorts—such as rules barring relevant evidence 
believed to pose a risk of unfair prejudice,46 rules barring the admission of 
relevant hearsay,47 and rules barring the use of relevant character evidence 
to prove how a person behaved on a particular occasion48—raise a variety 
of significant difficulties.  Two of those problems are familiar and are refe-
renced in this Article’s opening paragraph.  First, as Jeremy Bentham 
pointed out nearly two centuries ago, exclusionary rules can frustrate ef-
forts to achieve justice when they deprive the fact-finder of evidence that 
rationally bears upon a defendant’s likely guilt or innocence: “Evidence is 
 
 42. See infra Part I.A. 
 43. See infra Part I.B. 
 44. See infra Part II.A. 
 45. See infra Part II.B. 
 46. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury”). 
 47. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (declaring the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible). 
 48. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (banning, with limited exceptions, the admission of cha-
racter evidence aimed at proving how a person behaved on a particular occasion). 
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the basis of justice: exclude evidence, you exclude justice.”49  Second, as 
Professor Amar observes, when exclusionary rules lead to the suppression 
of “evidence the public knows to be true . . . the gap between public truth 
and truth allowed in the courtroom can demoralize the public, whose faith 
in the judicial system is a key goal of the public trial ideal.”50  There is, 
however, a third problem with exclusionary rules that has almost entirely 
escaped notice.  As I have argued elsewhere,51 exclusionary rules are mo-
rally problematic because they infringe upon jurors’ deliberative autonomy.  
In brief, the argument runs as follows. 
The first premise concerns each rational person’s moral claim to deliber-
ative autonomy.  Every rational individual is sovereign with respect to the 
use of his or her own physical and rational capacities.  As Immanuel Kant 
argued in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, “every rational 
being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily 
used by this or that will.”52  Kant’s “practical” imperative thus directs us to 
“[a]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of 
another, always as an end and never as a means only.”53  The practical im-
perative insists, in other words, that no rational being should be wholly in-
strumentalized by another.  As Alan Gewirth puts it, 
[a]ll the human rights . . . have as their aim that each person have rational 
autonomy in the sense of being a self-controlling, self-developing agent 
who can relate to other persons on a basis of mutual respect and coopera-
tion, in contrast to being a dependent, passive recipient of the agency of 
others.54 
 
 49. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 1 (1827); see also United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (stating that one of the exclusionary rule’s “social 
costs” is that it impedes “the truth-finding functions of judge and jury”). 
 50. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRIN-
CIPLES 119 (1997).  The public’s faith in the judicial system can similarly be undermined 
when the public believes that newly discovered evidence indicates that an innocent person 
has been wrongly convicted but the courts refuse to consider the evidence. See Todd E. Pet-
tys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2313, 2342 (2007) (“[T]he perceived moral authority of the criminal justice system is 
compromised, and the public’s confidence in the courts tested, when judges refuse to con-
sider a prisoner’s legal claims notwithstanding the prisoner’s presentation of significant evi-
dence that he or she might actually be innocent.”). 
 51. See Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2008 WIS. L. 
REV. 463.  Part I.A of the present Article briefly recounts arguments that I made at greater 
length in the Wisconsin Law Review. 
 52. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 52 (Harold Weis-
berg ed., Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969) (1785). 
 53. Id. at 54. 
 54. ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 5 
(1982); see also Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liber-
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Before launching medical treatment programs, for example, doctors pro-
vide their patients with relevant information and obtain their patients’ in-
formed consent, because failing to do so would dishonor patients’ delibera-
tive autonomy and would treat patients “merely as a means to whatever 
purpose the provider has in withholding or misrepresenting this informa-
tion.”55 
The second premise in the argument concerns rational decision makers’ 
use of relevant evidence.  When faced with the task of gathering evidence 
that might inform a decision, a rational person desires access to “as much 
of the available relevant evidence as is practicable under the circums-
tances.”56  As Frederick Schauer observes, we recognize that “informed 
and intelligent” choices can be made only when rational people have broad 
access to relevant information.57  Because obtaining and evaluating evi-
dence consumes time, money, and other valuable resources, the rational de-
cision maker does not necessarily wish to see and hear all of the relevant 
evidence before reaching a conclusion.  The rational patient who is facing a 
difficult treatment decision would rarely demand that she be told about 
every study that has ever been conducted on the given medical issue, for 
example, nor would she demand that researchers conduct costly new stu-
dies on her behalf before she makes her choice.  The rational patient simply 
desires as much of the relevant information as can reasonably be obtained 
and evaluated under the circumstances.  I use the phrase “reasonably avail-
able” as a shorthand means of identifying the evidence that a rational deci-
sion maker would wish to obtain and evaluate in a given instance. 
The third premise builds upon the first two: the government infringes 
upon a person’s deliberative autonomy when it withholds or suppresses 
reasonably available information that might rationally influence a decision 
that the person must make.  We see this belief reflected, for example, in the 
First Amendment’s celebrated protection of the freedom of speech.58  As 
David Strauss explains, Americans’ commitment to free speech is 
 
ty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (stating that “all basic liberties” are grounded in “au-
tonomy: the Kantian right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself”). 
 55. Candace Cummins Gauthier, Philosophical Foundations of Respect for Autonomy, 3 
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 21, 31 (1993); see also id. at 24 (“When we treat another person as 
an end in himself or herself, we respect that person’s dignity and intrinsic value as a rational 
and autonomous being.”). 
 56. Pettys, supra note 51, at 486-89; cf. Andrew McLaughlin, Rationality and Total 
Evidence, 37 PHIL. SCI. 271, 276 (1970) (arguing that, when a rational person is preparing to 
use inductive reasoning in order to reach a conclusion, he or she will desire access to as 
much of the relevant evidence as is practicable under the circumstances). 
 57. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 69 (1982). 
 58. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech . . . .”). 
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grounded, at least in part, in the conviction that the government infringes 
upon a citizen’s deliberative autonomy when it “interfere[s] with a person’s 
control over her own reasoning processes” by limiting the person’s access 
to opinions and information.59  We believe, Ronald Dworkin writes, that 
“[w]e retain our dignity, as individuals, only by insisting that no one—no 
official and no majority—has the right to withhold an opinion from us on 
the ground that we are not fit to hear and consider it.”60  When the govern-
ment withholds or suppresses reasonably available information that ration-
ally bears upon a choice that we face, the government thus infringes upon 
our deliberative autonomy in a morally troublesome way. 
Jurors, therefore, have an autonomy-based moral right not to have the 
government screen the relevant, reasonably available evidence that they 
will see and hear in the cases whose outcomes they have been charged to 
determine.  We infringe upon that right when we force jurors to make a de-
cision—a decision for which they will feel a significant measure of respon-
sibility and for which the public will indeed hold them at least partially re-
sponsible—yet withhold relevant evidence that a rational juror would wish 
to see or hear before rendering a verdict.61  To put it in the terminology of 
this Article’s title, we instrumentalize jurors in a morally problematic way 
when we withhold reasonably available evidence that might rationally in-
fluence their verdicts.  When we suppress relevant evidence, we treat jurors 
merely as a means to whatever ends we have in mind when we try to justify 
the evidence’s exclusion. 
By way of analogy, consider the candidate for public office who waits 
until after the election has been held to reveal damning information about 
his intentions as a public official.  Citizens who cast their ballots for that 
candidate, and later discover the information that the candidate concealed, 
may reasonably perceive that—to use the colloquial term—they have been 
“used.”  They may perceive that they have not been treated with the dignity 
they are owed as rational voters, and that they instead have been used 
merely as a means to the ends that prompted the candidate to withhold the 
information in the first place.  Or consider the faculty member who seeks to 
leverage a better compensation package for herself at her home institution 
by securing an offer of employment from another university.  When the lat-
 
 59. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 334, 354 (1991). 
 60. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 200 (1996). 
 61. Cf. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 
123 (1949) (stating that, because exclusionary rules so often are used to suppress relevant 
evidence, “frequently the jury cannot learn of matters which would lead an intelligent per-
son to a more correct knowledge of the facts”). 
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ter institution learns that the candidate secured its offer with no intention of 
ever accepting, the members of that institution’s hiring committee might 
well perceive that they have been immorally used merely as a means to the 
candidate’s objectives.  It is no different in the courtroom when we elicit 
verdicts from jurors based upon a government-redacted body of evidence—
we use jurors as instruments to achieve whatever ends have prompted us to 
withhold or suppress evidence that rational jurors would want to see or 
hear. 
Although American jurors have largely become accustomed to seeing 
the government infringe upon their deliberative autonomy in this way, the 
same cannot be said of decision makers in other countries.  Mirjan 
Damaška points out, for example, that in Continental legal systems, lay and 
professional judges insist upon maintaining their freedom to take a leading 
role in developing the body of evidence on which they base their verdicts. 
“Their freedom to do so is highly valued, because it is perceived as flowing 
from their responsibility for the correct decision—‘the truth.’  The notion 
that an adjudicator should accept responsibility for a judgment while at the 
mercy of information supplied by others bruises deeply ingrained Conti-
nental legal sensibilities.”62 
Infringing upon jurors’ deliberative autonomy by withholding relevant, 
reasonably available information is especially troubling in the United States 
because juries are a vital dimension of our system of self-government.  As 
Linda Kerber explains, “[m]embers of the founding generation construed 
jury service to be central to the process of democracy; it was the context in 
which average citizens exercised reflective judgment.”63  Believing that cit-
izens in our self-governing society ordinarily must be free to decide for 
themselves what is true,64 we hold that political speech is “entitled to the 
 
 62. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 91 (1997). 
 63. LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 129 (1998).  Others 
have made the same point. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 50, at 121-22 (“For the Framers, . . . 
the criminal jury was . . . a political institution embodying popular sovereignty and republi-
can self-government.  Through jury service, citizens would learn their rights and duties, and 
actively participate in the governance of society.”); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA 276 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835) 
(“The jury is both the most effective way of establishing the people’s rule and the most effi-
cient way of teaching them how to rule.”); Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American 
Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 55 (2001) (observing that jury service grants citizens “a 
measure of sovereign authority that is seldom assigned to lay persons”); Robert C. Walters 
et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 321 
(2005) (arguing that “the jury is arguably the purest form of democracy and self-
governance”). 
 64. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE 26-27 (1960). 
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fullest possible measure of constitutional protection.”65  The prevalent use 
of exclusionary rules in jury trials runs counter to those convictions.  When 
we withhold relevant evidence from jurors, we undercut their ability to 
serve a vitally important self-governance function.66 
B. The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule 
Weighty though it is, jurors’ moral claim of entitlement to see and hear 
all of the relevant, reasonably available evidence in a case is not absolute; 
that claim might be outweighed in a given instance by other social goods.67  
In sexual-assault cases, for example, we exclude potentially relevant evi-
dence of the victim’s past sexual conduct because we fear that victims oth-
erwise will be deterred from pressing charges against their attackers.68  We 
similarly often suppress potentially relevant statements made by criminal 
defendants and prosecutors during plea negotiations, in order to maintain 
defendants’ and prosecutors’ incentives to enter those valuable discus-
sions.69  In both of those instances, the argument against fully honoring ju-
rors’ deliberative autonomy is quite plausible because excluding the given 
evidence is essential to achieving other important social objectives: sexual-
assault victims might indeed refuse to press charges if evidence of their 
sexual histories were admissible, and defendants and prosecutors alike 
might indeed refuse to enter meaningful plea negotiations if they had cause 
to fear that their statements could be introduced into evidence at trial.  
When evaluating the appropriateness of those or other forms of exclusio-
nary rules, therefore, one must weigh the social evils that application of the 
rule entails against the social goods that the rule helps to achieve. 
That kind of balancing already explicitly occurs in the Fourth Amend-
ment setting.  “[B]ecause the [Fourth Amendment exclusionary] rule is 
prudential rather than constitutionally mandated,” the Court has explained, 
“we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits out-
weigh its substantial social costs.”70  Among the interrelated social costs 
 
 65. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816 (1984). 
 66. Cf. AMAR, supra note 50, at 124 (“[H]ow can the jury judge well on behalf of the 
community if, because of upside-down exclusion rules, it is denied reliable information that 
is known to the general community?”). 
 67. See generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 32 
(1988) (“[A]utonomy is both important normatively and fundamental conceptually.  Neither 
of these precludes the possibility that other concepts are both important and fundamental.”). 
 68. See FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 69. See FED. R. EVID. 410. 
 70. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (“[T]he bene-
fits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.” (citation omitted)); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 
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that the Court has identified thus far are the ways in which the exclusionary 
rule impedes “the truth-finding function of judge and jury,”71 enables guilty 
(and perhaps dangerous) defendants to go free or to secure more favorable 
plea bargains,72 and brings disrespect upon the criminal justice system.73  A 
social cost that the Court has not yet taken into account, and which makes 
applications of the exclusionary rule even more problematic, is the rule’s 
infringement upon jurors’ deliberative autonomy.  As I argued in Part I.A 
with respect to exclusionary rules of all sorts, jurors in any given case have 
a moral right to see and hear all of the reasonably available evidence that 
rationally bears upon the verdict that we have asked them to issue.74 
For at least four reasons, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule’s in-
fringement upon jurors’ deliberative autonomy is especially troubling.  
First, because deficiencies in jurors’ rational capacities play no role in jus-
tifying the evidence’s suppression in the Fourth Amendment setting, jurors’ 
autonomy-based moral entitlements are present in full force when courts 
decide to apply the exclusionary rule.  Jurors’ claim to deliberative auton-
omy is grounded in, and bounded by, their rational capacities; it is their sta-
tus as rational beings that undergirds their entitlement not to be used whol-
ly as a means to others’ ends.75  The government is thus morally entitled to 
suppress relevant evidence when that evidence would either compromise or 
circumvent jurors’ rational capacities and thereby provoke jurors to re-
spond with an irrational or poorly reasoned verdict.76  In such instances, the 
government protects litigants from unreasonable outcomes, and protects ju-
 
U.S. 586, 595-96 (2006) (weighing the deterrence value of the rule in a particular setting 
against the rule’s social costs). 
 71. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (noting the undesirability of setting “the dangerous at 
large”); Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08 (noting the undesirability of releasing or otherwise favor-
ably treating guilty defendants). 
 73. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 908.  The Court has identified additional costs that arise in 
fact-specific settings.  The Court has concluded, for example, that applying the exclusionary 
rule to violations of the knock-and-announce rule would likely invite a flood of meritless 
claims, and would cause police officers to be reluctant to enter homes—and thereby prevent 
an occupant’s hasty destruction of evidence—even after waiting a reasonable time for an 
occupant to respond. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595. 
 74. See supra Part I.A. 
 75. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text; see also Fried, supra note 54, at 233 
(“Our ability to deliberate, to reach conclusions about our good, and to act on those conclu-
sions is the foundation of our status as free and rational persons.”). 
 76. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 151 
(1989) (“The government must protect citizens from social harms, and many fellow citizens 
do not act in a rational and autonomous way.”).  See generally CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, 
CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 124 (1996) (“[W]hen Kant says rational nature or humani-
ty is an end in itself, it is the power of rational choice that he is referring to, and in particu-
lar, the power to set an end . . . and pursue it by rational means.”). 
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rors themselves from having their rational capacities temporarily over-
whelmed by exceptionally powerful non-rational influences.77  When a par-
ticular item of evidence causes jurors to experience overpowering feelings 
of disgust or rage, for example, there is a risk that jurors will render a ver-
dict before they have rationally evaluated all of the evidence in the case, 
and will regret their decision once their emotions have cooled.78  Exclusion 
in such instances not only can be morally justified, but might also be mo-
rally essential from the vantage points of litigants and jurors alike. 
In the Fourth Amendment setting, however, evidence is excluded for 
reasons having nothing to do with preventing irrational or poorly reasoned 
outcomes.79  The illegally obtained evidence is excluded not to preclude 
unreasonable juror responses, but rather to deter future violations of the 
Fourth Amendment by law enforcement personnel.80  When the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is applied, therefore, jurors’ rationality—and 
the moral entitlements which that rationality supports—are presumptively 
fully present. 
Second, unlike many of the exclusionary rules that federal courts rou-
tinely apply, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is highly controver-
sial among the American public, and so it is unreasonable to presume that 
jurors are willing to help serve the exclusionary rule’s deterrence-focused 
ends.  With many other exclusionary rules—such as the rule protecting al-
leged sexual-assault victims from certain evidentiary uses of their sexual 
histories,81 or the rule enabling prosecutors and criminal defendants to enter 
plea negotiations without fear of negative ramifications at trial82—one 
would expect to find broad (albeit not universal) agreement among citizens 
both that those rules’ objectives are desirable and that excluding evidence 
is often a sensible means of achieving them.  The Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule, however, remains the subject of sharp public disagreement.  
 
 77. See Pettys, supra note 51, at 500-05. 
 78. See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (authorizing the exclusion of relevant evidence 
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”); id. 
advisory committee’s note (stating that unfairly prejudicial evidence is evidence that has “an 
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessari-
ly, an emotional one”). 
 79. See Friendly, supra note 31, at 951 (“The basis for excluding real evidence obtained 
by an unconstitutional search is not at all that use of the evidence may result in unreliable 
fact-finding.  The evidence is likely to be the most reliable that could possibly be obtained . . 
. .”). 
 80. See supra notes 1-27 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusionary rule’s ori-
gins and deterrence rationale). 
 81. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence). 
 82. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence). 
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Like Judge Cardozo83 and Professor Amar,84 many Americans balk at the 
notion that excluding powerful evidence of a criminal defendant’s guilt is 
an acceptable means of deterring Fourth Amendment violations.85  One 
thus cannot presume that all—or even most—jurors would be willing to be 
yoked in service to the exclusionary rule and its deterrence-focused objec-
tives. 
Third, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule’s claim to democratic 
legitimacy is weaker than that of most other federal exclusionary rules.  
The exclusionary rules that are contained within the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence all have been promulgated by elected federal officials.  The Supreme 
Court and the Federal Rules Advisory Committee took the lead in drafting 
many (though not all86) of those rules, but those rules did not become effec-
tive until they had received Congress’s blessing.87  Therefore, to the extent 
that the actions of the people’s elected representatives can waive or weaken 
citizen-jurors’ moral claims, jurors’ moral objections to the exclusionary 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence are at least somewhat demo-
cratically ameliorated. 
One cannot make that same argument in the Fourth Amendment setting.  
Although some of the Court’s early cases suggested that the exclusionary 
rule was dictated by the popularly ratified Fourth Amendment itself,88 the 
Court today insists that the rule is entirely of the Court’s own making.89  
 
 83. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting Judge Cardozo’s views). 
 84. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting Professor Amar’s views). 
 85. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1239 (1989) 
(book review) (stating that, like the death penalty and prayer in public schools, the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is among “the controversial issues of the day”); Harold J. 
Krent, How to Move Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: Structuring Judicial Response to Legis-
lative Reform Efforts, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 855, 855 (1999) (“The exclusionary rule remains one 
of the most controversial judicial doctrines of this era.”). 
 86. Rules 413, 414, and 415 (concerning the admission of evidence of a person’s prior 
sexual offenses), for example, were drafted in the first instance by Congress. See Joseph A. 
Aluise, Note, Evidence of Prior Sexual Misconduct in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation 
Proceedings: Did Congress Err in Passing Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415?, 
14 J.L. & POL. 153, 159-66 (1998) (describing the Congressional origins of those three 
rules). 
 87. See OLIN GUY WELLBORN III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 3-
4 (5th ed. 2009) (describing the legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 88. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) (insisting that the exclusionary 
rule “is of constitutional origin”); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 
392 (1920) (stating that permitting the government to use illegally obtained evidence in a 
criminal prosecution would “reduce[] the Fourth Amendment to a form of words”); Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (stating that, if there were no exclusionary rule, 
the Fourth Amendment “might as well be stricken from the Constitution”). 
 89. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (“We have repeatedly 
rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment 
violation.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984) (rejecting the Court’s own 
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The rule was not contemplated by the Fourth Amendment’s framers, nor 
was it approved by those who ratified the Fourth Amendment’s text.90  Nor 
has the rule subsequently been formally approved by the people’s elected 
representatives in Congress.  To the contrary, some elected officials have 
considered trying to abolish the rule entirely, replacing it with a legislative 
scheme in which damages would be payable to the victims of Fourth 
Amendment violations.91  Because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule was crafted and approved by the Court and not by Congress, it lacks 
the democratic pedigree necessary to support the argument that, through 
their elected leaders, citizen-jurors have compromised their ability to com-
plain that the rule infringes upon their deliberative autonomy. 
Fourth, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is likely not essential 
to achieving the deterrence objectives for which it was designed.  Rather 
than depend upon the exclusion of potentially powerful evidence to deter 
illegal searches and seizures, the nation could rely primarily upon financial 
disincentives instead.92  That was not true in the era to which the exclusio-
nary rule traces its roots.  As the Court pointed out in Hudson v. Michigan, 
exclusion was likely the only meaningful way to deter Fourth Amendment 
violations in the early twentieth century.93  It was not until the Court’s 1961 
 
prior suggestions that the exclusionary rule is mandated by the Fourth Amendment and stat-
ing that “the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure the invasion of the defen-
dant’s rights which he has already suffered”); Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule “is a judicially created remedy designed to safe-
guard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved”); see also Amar, supra note 7, at 761 (arguing 
that the terms of the Fourth Amendment “do not require—or even invite—exclusions of 
evidence, contraband, or stolen goods”). 
 90. See Amar, supra note 7, at 786 (“Tort law remedies were . . . clearly the ones pre-
supposed by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment . . . .  Supporters of the exclusionary 
rule cannot point to a single major statement from the Founding—or even the antebellum or 
Reconstruction eras—supporting Fourth Amendment exclusion of evidence in a criminal 
trial.”); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 52 
(“[T]he English cases that inspired the Fourth Amendment were not criminal cases, in which 
a defendant was seeking to escape conviction; they were tort cases in which the victims of 
unreasonable searches were seeking damages for invasion of their lawful interests.”); cf. 
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1371 (“The congressional debates over the text of the proposed 
amendment shed no light on whether it was intended to require the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence, and the ratification debates are equally silent.”). 
 91. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1398 (describing the introduction and failure of such 
legislation in the 97th and 98th Congresses).  One cannot safely assume that Congress’s 
failure to enact such legislation demonstrates Congress’s approval of the exclusionary rule.  
Most elected leaders might agree that some feature of existing law in a given area is deeply 
flawed, but the status quo will persist until a majority in Congress can agree upon how best 
to fix it. 
 92. See infra Part II.B. 
 93. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006). 
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ruling in Monroe v. Pape,94 for example, that § 198395 was held to provide 
a remedy against police officers who abuse their authority under state 
law;96 it was not until the Court’s 1971 ruling in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics97 that the Fourth 
Amendment was itself held to provide a remedy against federal officers 
who violate a person’s Fourth Amendment rights;98 and it was not until the 
Court’s 1978 ruling in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City 
of New York99 that § 1983 was held to provide a remedy against a munici-
pality whose law enforcement officers violate a person’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights in accordance with the municipality’s official policies or cus-
toms.100  As I shall briefly argue below,101 further changes in the law are 
necessary in order to render the threat of financial liability a powerful de-
terrent to Fourth Amendment violations.  The point for our present purpos-
es is simply that, provided the threat of financial liability is made suffi-
ciently great, the exclusionary rule is not the only means of effectively 
deterring Fourth Amendment violations.  Because the exclusionary rule is 
not essential to achieving the social objectives for which it was designed, 
the rule’s infringement upon jurors’ deliberative autonomy is that much 
more troubling. 
In cases in which law enforcement officials have illegally obtained 
damning evidence of a criminal defendant’s guilt, judges and jurors thus 
stand in very different moral positions.  Trial judges agree to work under 
the constraints that the Supreme Court imposes, they know the nature of the 
illegally obtained evidence in the cases that come before them, and they are 
the ones who declare that the finder of fact should not consider the ill-
gotten evidence.  Jurors, on the other hand, often serve against their will,102 
they might wish to play no part in acquitting guilty and perhaps dangerous 
defendants as a means of deterring future Fourth Amendment violations, 
they likely have no idea that the illegally seized evidence even exists, and 
 
 94. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. N.Y. City 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a cause of action against any person who, under 
color of state law, deprives another person of a federal right). 
 96. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184-87. 
 97. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 98. See id. at 392-97. 
 99. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 100. See id. at 690-94. 
 101. See infra Parts II.B.1-3. 
 102. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006) (“It is . . . the policy of the United States that 
all citizens . . . shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that pur-
pose.”); id. § 1864(b) (authorizing fines, imprisonment, or both for citizens who disobey a 
summons to appear for jury service). 
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they play no role in shaping the body of evidence on which they must base 
their verdict.  In Kantian terms, the exclusionary rule treats the trial judge 
“as an end.”103  He or she hears all of the relevant facts and chooses to 
serve as an actor in the exclusionary-rule drama that the Court has devised.  
Jurors, in contrast, typically do not knowingly participate in the exclusio-
nary rule’s operation—they are treated merely as a means to the deterrence-
focused ends that the Court created the rule to serve.  When jurors acquit a 
defendant and learn later that suppressed evidence powerfully suggested 
the defendant’s guilt, they can try to find comfort in agency denial,104 tell-
ing themselves that the law is to be blamed for any outcomes they find re-
grettable.  But there is no denying that they have been instrumentalized in 
service to the Court’s objectives. 
What we find, therefore, is that the social costs of the exclusionary rule 
differ, depending upon whether a criminal defendant invokes his or her 
right to trial by jury.  In bench trials, the exclusionary rule entails only 
those significant social costs that the Court has already identified and has 
taken into account when shaping the exclusionary-rule doctrines that exist 
today.  But when a jury is serving as the finder of fact, we also must con-
sider the rule’s infringement upon jurors’ deliberative autonomy—a social 
cost that the Court has not yet even acknowledged, much less taken into 
account.  When we ask in a given case whether the rule’s deterrence bene-
fits “outweigh its substantial social costs,”105 we thus might well discover 
that we can justify applying the rule only if the trial judge decides the case. 
II.  REMEDYING THE PROBLEM 
There are a variety of ways in which we might respond to the moral dif-
ficulties entailed by applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in 
cases tried by juries.  As one sorts through the problems that a few of those 
purported solutions present, one begins to suspect that the best approach 
might be to abandon the exclusionary rule entirely. 
A. Lesser Approaches 
Short of abandoning the exclusionary rule altogether, there are at least 
three ways in which we could try to address the rule’s infringement upon 
jurors’ deliberative autonomy.  First, we could ensure that jurors’ participa-
tion in the exclusionary rule’s operation is both knowing and voluntary.  
Ordinarily, a judge instructs jurors prior to trial merely that they must dis-
 
 103. See KANT, supra note 52, at 52, 54. 
 104. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing agency denial). 
 105. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). 
PETTYS_CHRISTENSEN2 6/13/2010  8:43 PM 
2010] INSTRUMENTALIZING JURORS 855 
regard all evidence that the judge rules inadmissible and must disregard any 
information that they happen to see or hear outside the courtroom.106  
When trial judges offer jurors an explanation for the exclusion of evidence, 
the explanation often focuses on the risk that the excluded evidence would 
result in an irrational or poorly reasoned verdict.107  In cases involving 
Fourth Amendment violations, we could go much further than that: we 
could tell members of the jury pool that the trial judge is going to suppress 
one or more items of illegally seized evidence in order to deter future 
Fourth Amendment violations, and then permit prospective jurors to leave 
if they are not willing to serve under those circumstances.  Just as medical 
patients “give their informed and autonomous consent to a proposal that 
certain kinds of information about their treatment might be withheld from 
them,”108 jurors would be participating in the Court’s exclusionary-rule 
drama on terms consistent with their status as rational, autonomous beings. 
There is, however, an obvious problem with that approach.  Any refer-
ence to excluded evidence of the defendant’s guilt would prejudice the de-
fendant by inviting jurors to speculate about the nature of that evidence, to 
ascribe more probative value to the suppressed evidence than it might ac-
tually possess, and to resolve close cases against the defendant based upon 
the assumption that seeing the suppressed evidence would have eliminated 
any lingering doubts about the defendant’s guilt.  It would be perverse to 
honor jurors’ deliberative autonomy at the cost of placing criminal defen-
dants in a predicament that is potentially worse than the one they would 
face if the fruits of the illegal search were simply admitted into evidence. 
Second, in accordance with the Court’s determination that the exclusio-
nary rule ought to be applied only when the rule’s deterrence value out-
weighs its social costs,109 we might continue to use a balancing test to eva-
luate the rule’s applicability in various factual settings, and treat the rule’s 
infringement on jurors’ deliberative autonomy as an additional factor 
 
 106. See, e.g., 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS: CRIMINAL § 10.01, at 2 (6th ed. 2008) (“Statements or exhibits which are not ‘admit-
ted into evidence’ may not be considered by you in reaching your verdict.”); id. at 5 (“You 
must not consider any evidence to which an objection has been sustained or which I have 
instructed you to disregard. . . . You must not consider anything you may have read or heard 
about the case outside of this courtroom . . . .”). 
 107. See, e.g., JOSEPHINE R. POTUTO ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 
1.17 (2d ed. 1993) (proposing a jury instruction which states that excluded evidence is 
usually “unimportant or unreliable” or would cause jurors “to respond emotionally,” and 
that “[i]t is because the law protects what [jurors] hear that we have such confidence in the 
impartiality and the integrity of the jury”). 
 108. Dean Cocking & Justin Oakley, Medical Experimentation, Informed Consent and 
Using People, 8 BIOETHICS 293, 299 (1994). 
 109. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s balancing 
test). 
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weighing against the rule’s application when jurors are serving as the find-
ers of fact.  While appearing to fit nicely within the Court’s existing analyt-
ic framework, this approach has the disadvantage of placing that frame-
work under added scrutiny and pressure, neither of which it can easily bear. 
The rhetoric of balancing can serve the judiciary reasonably well when 
the courts are announcing a new constitutional or prudential rule and when 
numerous exceptions to that rule are not anticipated.  Judges can describe 
the competing factors they have taken into account with respect to the giv-
en problem, and then announce the rule that will henceforth embody the 
judges’ net assessment of how those competing factors shake out.110  But if 
the rule is one to which the courts will make numerous exceptions, such 
that judges must repeatedly re-strike the balance in order to account for va-
rying factual scenarios, then the courts’ use of balancing rhetoric can 
quickly wear thin.111  The more often that judges purport to drag their 
scales from their closets in order to reshape a rule or reassess the range of a 
rule’s proper application, the more the public is given cause to wonder 
about the nature of those mysterious scales and whether the judges’ use of 
those scales is entirely judicial in character.112 
With respect to the balancing that the Court purports to conduct regard-
ing the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, it is easy enough for the Jus-
tices merely to recite the various factors that the Court must weigh in the 
balance, with the deterrence value of the rule’s application on one side and 
certain social costs entailed by the rule’s application on the other.  It is ex-
ceptionally difficult, however, to devise a means by which those competing 
values can be translated into what Alexander Aleinikoff calls “a common 
currency for comparison.”113  How, for example, does the Court weigh the 
value of deterring future violations of the Fourth Amendment against the 
value of using damning evidence to secure the incarceration of dangerous 
 
 110. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.03, at 2-15 to -18 
(1984) (describing this as “definitional balancing,” in contrast to the “ad hoc balancing” ap-
proach that is often used to determine results on a case-by-case basis).  Later editions of 
Professor Nimmer’s treatise abandoned the term “definitional balancing,” concluding that 
“[t]he term has not caught on.” 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH § 2:12, at 2-7 n.1 (2010). 
 111. Cf. NIMMER, supra note 110, at 2-17 to -18 (defending “definitional balancing” 
when it truly generates a rule that “can be employed in future cases without the occasion for 
further weighing of interests,” although conceding that definitional balancing cannot “offer 
absolute assurance that a given court under sufficient internal or external pressure in some 
‘hard’ case will not depart from a definitional rule”). 
 112. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1187 (1989) (conceding that “[w]e will have . . . balancing modes of analysis with us forev-
er,” but arguing that such “modes of analysis [should] be avoided where possible”). 
 113. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 973 (1987). 
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criminals?  Both of those are indisputably “weighty” concerns; but by what 
shared unit of measurement can one be said to outweigh the other?114  In 
the absence of a common currency, how can one be assured that the Justic-
es are doing something more exalted than merely implementing their own 
personal preferences?115  When the Court repeatedly re-strikes the balance 
in order to take account of differing arrays of social costs and deterrent ef-
fects, at what point must one say that the Justices are behaving more like 
legislators than like members of the judicial branch?  Asking the Court to 
take a newly perceived social cost into account and to engage in an even 
more complicated balancing analysis than that in which the Court has pre-
viously engaged thus places added pressure on an analytic framework that 
is not terribly robust to begin with. 
Those problems are rendered even more acute by the fact that the Court 
does not know the precise strength of its chief premise—namely, that the 
exclusionary rule does indeed deter Fourth Amendment violations.  From a 
common-sense perspective, one can readily grant that the rule does deter 
some Fourth Amendment violations; there are undoubtedly occasions when 
law enforcement officers resist the temptation to cut corners, in order to en-
sure that prosecutors can use any evidence that the officers ultimately ob-
tain to secure a conviction.  But as Albert Alschuler recently noted, precise-
ly “[q]uantifying the behavioral effects of the exclusionary rule is  
. . . impossible,”116 and everyone who has searched for compelling evi-
dence that the exclusionary rule “substantially increase[s] police com-
pliance with the Fourth Amendment” has failed to find it.117  Even if the 
competing variables could be reduced to a common unit of measurement, it 
nevertheless would be exceptionally difficult to ascertain just how weighty 
the countervailing social costs would have to be in order to render the ex-
clusionary rule inapplicable. 
For those concerned about the exclusionary rule’s infringement upon ju-
rors’ deliberative autonomy, therefore, it is hard to take comfort in the pro-
 
 114. See id. at 975 (stating that, in the exclusionary rule setting, “the Court has not devel-
oped any common scale for evaluation”). 
 115. Id. at 973 (“Balancing . . . must demand the development of a scale of values exter-
nal to the Justices’ personal preferences.  But from where and what might such a scale be 
derived?  This is a problem that has bedeviled balancers for some time.”); see id. at 976 
(stating that the balancing often “takes place inside a black box”). 
 116. Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2008). 
 117. Id. at 1383; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (stating that 
“it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be assembled” to prove the extent 
of the exclusionary rule’s deterrent value); LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 3 (observing that 
there is evidence that the exclusionary rule does have value as a deterrent, but it is difficult 
to quantify the rule’s deterrent effects). 
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posal that the Court simply treat that infringement as one more social cost 
to be weighed in the balance.  At some point in the discussion of the factors 
that deserve a place on the scale and of the weight that each of those factors 
carries, one must finally concede that the discussion presupposes the exis-
tence of a finely tuned scale that the Court does not actually possess.  There 
simply is no means by which it objectively could be said that the addition 
or subtraction of any single social cost would tip the balance in favor of or 
against the rule’s application.  The language of scales and balancing is 
merely the language that the Justices use to describe their own individual 
efforts to take account of competing values.  Absent a reason to believe that 
there are instances when taking account of jurors’ deliberative autonomy 
would oblige courts to demand even greater deterrence value from the ex-
clusionary rule before suppressing relevant evidence, there is no reason to 
believe that courts are paying jurors’ deliberative autonomy any serious re-
gard at all. 
Third, because the moral concerns I have identified arise with jurors and 
not with judges,118 we might conclude that courts simply should refuse to 
apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in all cases tried by juries.  
A criminal defendant whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated 
would then be put to a choice: he could forego his right to trial by jury and 
obtain the benefits of the exclusionary rule by placing his fate in the hands 
of a trial judge who has announced her intention to disregard the illegally 
obtained evidence, or he could invoke his right to trial by jury but suffer the 
admission of the fruits of the illegal search. 
I confess that I was rather enamored with this proposal when I first be-
gan to draft this Article, and that I continue to feel a lingering attraction to 
it today.  After all, the suggestion is not as radical as one might initially 
suppose: the choice between bench and jury trials already often carries evi-
dentiary consequences of at least an informal sort.  Although the Federal 
Rules of Evidence formally apply in bench and jury trials alike,119 the 
stringency with which those rules are applied often varies depending on 
whether judges or jurors are serving as the triers of fact.120  Many of those 
 
 118. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (summarizing the different moral 
concerns entailed by the exclusionary rule’s application in bench and jury trials). 
 119. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(a), (b) (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in 
the United States district courts’ civil and criminal proceedings). 
 120. See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 1.7, at 1:32 
(2001) (“[I]t is clear that both scholars and judges generally tend to favor much more open 
admissibility in bench trials than in jury trials.”); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRI-
ALS AT COMMON LAW § 4d.1, at 213-14 (Peter Tillers rev. ed., 1983) (“In most jurisdictions 
the ordinary rules of evidence are nominally applicable in non-jury trials.  However, many 
of the exclusionary rules are not vigorously enforced in bench trials.”); cf. Richard A. Posn-
er, Comment on Lempert on Posner, 87 VA. L. REV. 1713, 1714 n.8 (2001) (“Most lawyers 
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evidentiary rules are based upon the premise that jurors are susceptible to 
non-rational influences and cognitive errors; because trial judges believe 
they are less susceptible than laypeople to those decision-making pitfalls, 
they often relax the rules’ requirements when jurors are absent.121  With re-
spect to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, we might simply flip 
that usual way of thinking and hold that the rule applies only when the case 
is being adjudicated by the trial judge alone. 
If we took that approach, however, we would lose much of whatever de-
terrent power the exclusionary rule currently exerts.  Of course, that would 
be of no particular concern if law enforcement officers and their employers 
knew that Fourth Amendment violations would likely result in significant 
financial liability.  If that were the case, the loss of the exclusionary rule’s 
deterrent effects in cases tried by juries would be largely inconsequential: 
the financial disincentives would pick up the slack left by the exclusionary 
rule’s absence.  But assume for the moment that officers and their employ-
ers do not currently have satisfactorily strong financial incentives to honor 
suspects’ Fourth Amendment rights (an assumption I will endorse in Part 
II.B).  If we declared the exclusionary rule inapplicable in all jury-tried 
cases, then Fourth Amendment violations likely would not result in any sa-
tisfactorily adverse consequences for law enforcement officials in those 
cases, and the opportunity to use those violations as an occasion to send 
public-benefitting deterrence signals to governments and their agents 
would be lost. 
Before abandoning the exclusionary rule in cases tried by juries, there-
fore, we would want to be sure that the law imposed a threat of financial 
liability sufficient to deter Fourth Amendment violations.  Once we had as-
sured ourselves on that front, however, the case for maintaining the exclu-
sionary rule even for bench trials would crumble.  After all, if we can 
achieve satisfactory deterrence through financial liability for misconduct in 
cases that ultimately are tried by juries, then surely we can use that same 
system of financial liability to draw deterrent effects from cases that ulti-
mately are tried solely by judges. 
B. Abandoning the Exclusionary Rule 
That leads to the fourth and final way in which we might respond to the 
exclusionary rule’s infringement upon jurors’ deliberative autonomy: we 
 
and judges have quite a relaxed sense of the rules of evidence, often ignoring them by tacit 
agreement and not only in bench trials.”). 
 121. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 60, at 238 (John Wil-
liam Strong ed., 1992) (stating that there is a reduced need for exclusionary rules in bench 
trials because “judges possess professional experience in valuing evidence”). 
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might entirely discard the exclusionary rule and replace it with a set of ro-
bust financial remedies aimed at strongly discouraging Fourth Amendment 
violations.  In earlier generations, the Court might have regarded that pro-
posal as a non-starter.  In its recent Fourth Amendment rulings, however, 
the Court has made it clear that it regards the exclusionary rule as less es-
sential today than it was during the first half of the twentieth century, and 
that it believes financial remedies are now a plausible alternative means of 
deterring at least some forms of police misconduct. 
Writing for a narrow majority four years ago in Hudson v. Michigan,122 
Justice Scalia underscored the Court’s belief that the financial remedies 
available under §§ 1983 and 1988 are adequate to deter violations of the 
Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule.123  The Court stressed that 
those remedies were not available against state law enforcement officers 
half a century ago when the Court extended the exclusionary rule to state-
court proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio.124  Additionally, the Court observed 
that law enforcement leaders had placed “a new emphasis on internal police 
discipline” in recent decades, thereby prodding departments and their offic-
ers to become more professional in their conduct.125  The Court concluded 
that, wholly apart from the exclusionary rule, the deterrents against knock-
and-announce violations are “incomparably greater than the factors deter-
ring warrantless entries when Mapp was decided.”126  Bearing in mind its 
belief that judges should use the exclusionary rule to deter Fourth Amend-
ment violations only as a “last resort,”127 the Court determined that there 
was no need for the exclusionary rule in the knock-and-announce setting.128 
That same skepticism about the exclusionary rule’s necessity appeared 
last year in Herring v. United States, when the Court refused to apply the 
rule to Fourth Amendment violations resulting from negligent bookkeeping 
by police department employees.129  The Court indicated that the exclusio-
nary rule is appropriately applied only when Fourth Amendment violations 
 
 122. 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (5-4 decision). 
 123. See id. at 597; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a cause of action against 
state officials for certain violations of federal rights); id. § 1988(b) (authorizing the award of 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in actions brought under § 1983); supra notes 23-25 
and accompanying text (discussing Hudson). 
 124. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).  The 
Court also noted that additional rulings in the 1960s and 1970s paved the way for similar 
remedies in actions against municipalities and federal law enforcement officials. See id.; see 
also supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (noting these rulings). 
 125. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598-99. 
 126. Id. at 599. 
 127. Id. at 591. 
 128. See id. at 599. 
 129. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (noting Herring’s holding). 
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are “flagrant,” “deliberate,” “patently unconstitutional,” “reckless,” or 
“grossly negligent”—that is, when the violations are akin to the “abuses 
that gave rise to the exclusionary rule” nearly a century ago.130  Despite the 
fact that much of our tort system is built upon the premise that the threat of 
financial liability can meaningfully deter merely negligent behavior—a 
point that the dissent was quick to make131 and that the majority conceded 
in a footnote132—the Court found the exclusionary rule inappropriate for 
merely negligent police conduct.  “To trigger the exclusionary rule,” the 
Court wrote, “police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion 
can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is 
worth the price paid by the justice system.”133  The Court held that a negli-
gent bookkeeping error “does not rise to that level.”134 
When placed side by side with one another, Hudson’s discussion of al-
ternative means of deterrence and Herring’s decision to limit the exclusio-
nary rule to the most egregious Fourth Amendment violations take on a 
significance that is both striking and portentous.  When police misconduct 
is “flagrant” or otherwise plainly unconstitutional, qualified immunity is 
likely to fail as a defense and financial liability is accordingly much more 
likely to attach.  Law enforcement officers are entitled to the qualified-
immunity defense only when “their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”135  A victim of a Fourth Amendment violation can overcome 
that defense only if, at the time of the challenged conduct, “the contours of 
the [Fourth Amendment] right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”136  If a 
Fourth Amendment violation is “flagrant,” “deliberate,” “patently unconsti-
 
 130. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701-02 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra 
notes 8-16 and accompanying text (describing some of those early abuses). 
 131. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 132. See id. at 702 n.4. 
 133. Id. at 702.  That was Judge Friendly’s view, as well. See Friendly, supra note 31, at 
952 (“[T]he object of deterrence would be sufficiently achieved if the police were denied the 
fruit of activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal . . . .”). 
 134. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.  
 135. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 
603, 609 (1999) (reiterating this rule and explaining that it applies identically in actions 
brought under § 1983 against state officers and in actions brought under Bivens against fed-
eral officers). 
 136. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  The Court has explained that 
government officials are entitled to “fair warning” of the kinds of conduct for which they 
might be held personally liable. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1997).  So 
long as established legal principles fairly put officials on notice of the conduct that will trig-
ger personal liability, officers can be held personally liable “even in novel factual circums-
tances.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
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tutional,” “reckless,” or “grossly negligent”137—as the Herring Court said 
that a violation must be in order for the exclusionary rule to apply—then 
financial liability is a real possibility.  Yet if financial liability is indeed a 
significant threat, then Hudson’s chief premise moves to the fore: courts 
should apply the exclusionary rule to a given species of Fourth Amendment 
violation only if there are no other adequate means of deterring such mis-
conduct in the future.138  By restricting the exclusionary rule to only the 
most obvious Fourth Amendment violations, the Court is thus restricting 
the rule to cases where financial remedies are most likely to provide an al-
ternative mechanism for deterrence.  It appears, in short, that the Court has 
teed up the exclusionary rule for its ultimate rejection. 
Why, then, didn’t the Court in Herring simply abandon the exclusionary 
rule entirely?  Presumably, it is because there are not yet five Justices who 
are prepared to say that, with respect to those egregious Fourth Amendment 
violations to which the exclusionary rule’s application is now limited, the 
threat of financial recovery is indeed sufficiently robust to render the exclu-
sionary rule’s deterrent effects superfluous.  That was the sticking point for 
Chief Justice Warren Burger in his well-known opposition to the exclusio-
nary rule nearly forty years ago,139 and it is a point on which the dissenting 
Justices pushed hard in both Hudson and Herring.140  There are indeed nu-
merous ways in which existing law prevents the threat of financial liability 
from exerting the kind of deterrent power necessary to render the exclusio-
nary rule dispensable.141  Eliminate enough of the barriers to meaningful 
financial consequences for Fourth Amendment violations, however, and the 
exclusionary rule is almost certain to be relegated to the pages of history. 
For illustrative purposes, I briefly identify below three ways in which 
champions of jurors’ deliberative autonomy and other opponents of the ex-
clusionary rule could productively focus their law-reform energies in an ef-
fort to render the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effects unnecessary.  Before 
entering any discussion of possible replacements for the exclusionary rule, 
 
 137. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701-02 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text (recounting Hudson’s reasoning). 
 139. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 420-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the exclusionary rule should 
be abandoned but only after “some meaningful alternative [has been] developed,” and urg-
ing Congress to take the lead in providing a system of financial remedies for Fourth 
Amendment violations). 
 140. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “[c]ivil liability 
will not lie for the vast majority of Fourth Amendment violations” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 611 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (sharply 
criticizing the majority’s suggestion that financial remedies provide adequate deterrence 
against violations of the knock-and-announce rule). 
 141. See infra Parts II.B.1-3 (identifying three such hindrances). 
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however, it is important to calibrate one’s expectations.  When it comes to 
securing satisfactory deterrent effects, we need not demand significantly 
greater measures of precision from the exclusionary rule’s replacement 
than we have accepted from the exclusionary rule itself.  Toward that end, 
it bears noting that the exclusionary rule is a remarkably crude deterrent 
device.  The rule only kicks in, for example, when an unlawful search cul-
minates in a criminal prosecution.  As Judge Richard Posner points out, the 
rule thus provides no deterrent against “the worst kind of police search . . . : 
the search of the known innocent for purposes purely of harassment.”142  
Even within the realm of those instances in which they do apply, the exclu-
sionary rule and its many exceptions comprise a blunt instrument for find-
ing the optimal point at which law enforcement officers are strongly en-
couraged to operate within the Fourth Amendment’s boundaries, yet not so 
cowed that they decline to take lawful and desirable actions aimed at cap-
turing criminals.143  One would think that the optimal level of deterrence 
could be found with greater precision through a system of financial disin-
centives that could more easily be fine-tuned.144 
What we need, therefore, is not a perfect substitute for the exclusionary 
rule, but rather a substitute that is likely to provide a satisfactory measure 
of deterrence without allowing guilty defendants to escape punishment, 
bringing the criminal-justice system into public disrepute, infringing upon 
jurors’ deliberative autonomy, or incurring any of the exclusionary rule’s 
other significant social costs.  Here are three ways in which we might move 
toward that objective: 
1. Broaden the Availability of Punitive Damages for Violations of the 
Fourth Amendment 
In civil actions alleging violations of Fourth Amendment rights today, 
courts restrict compensatory damages to those harms that plaintiffs actually 
suffered as a result of the unlawful invasion of their privacy.145  Compens-
able harms include such things as “physical injury, property damage, [and] 
injury to reputation,”146 as well as “mental suffering or emotional an-
 
 142. Posner, supra note 90, at 54. 
 143. See id. at 55-57. 
 144. See id.  In a related vein, Professor Amar points out that the exclusionary rule “over-
compensates” many criminal defendants by enabling them to escape punishment entirely, 
rather than, say, receive varying degrees of reduction in their prison sentences.  “[T]he more 
guilty [they] are,” Professor Amar writes, “the more [they] benefit.” Amar, supra note 7, at 
797. 
 145. See Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 964 (1999). 
 146. Id. 
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guish.”147  If a plaintiff proves that a defendant violated his or her Fourth 
Amendment rights but cannot prove that he or she suffered any compensa-
ble harm as a result, the plaintiff is likely to recover only nominal damages 
of a single dollar.148 
Needless to say, the sum of one dollar is hardly sufficient to give pause 
to law enforcement officers contemplating an illegal search.  Imagine, for 
example, that an officer wishes to obtain evidence illegally from a home, 
but wants to do it in a way that minimizes his or her financial exposure.  So 
far as compensatory damages are concerned, the officer merely needs to 
ensure that he or she avoids damaging the property, does not inflict any 
physical injuries, and treats the residence’s occupants in a manner unlikely 
to cause reputational harms or provoke mental anguish.  With those aims in 
mind, the officer might simply do what state and federal officers did nearly 
a century ago in Weeks: use a hidden house key to obtain access to the resi-
dence while its occupants are away.149  The Weeks Court created the exclu-
sionary rule in order to deter that kind of patently unconstitutional beha-
vior, and any system of financial remedies that is offered to supplant the 
exclusionary rule must deter that kind of misconduct as well. 
There are at least two ways in which we might change the existing law 
of damages in order to deter Fourth Amendment violations satisfactorily in 
the exclusionary rule’s absence.  First, we might design a schedule of fixed 
monetary awards, under which non-trivial sums are automatically 
awarded—even in the absence of physical, reputational, or mental harm—
upon proof that specified kinds of Fourth Amendment violations have oc-
curred.  One of the problems with that approach, however, is that it impli-
citly encourages decisions about trade-offs that we presumably do not want 
law enforcement officers to make.  Faced with a fixed schedule of mone-
tary payments, law enforcement officers might well decide that illegally se-
curing evidence of a suspect’s guilt in a given case is well worth the finan-
cial costs that will predictably follow.  As Walter Dellinger observed a 
number of years ago, we surely do not want to establish a system in which 
government officials can easily “decide whether the benefits of infringing 
the public’s right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures 
 
 147. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 n.20 (1978); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389-90, 397 (1971) (noting 
that Bivens had sought monetary damages for “humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suf-
fering as a result of the agents’ unlawful conduct,” and holding that Bivens was “entitled to 
recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents’ violation 
of the Amendment”). 
 148. See, e.g., Padilla v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 2d 453, 478 (M.D. Pa. 1999). 
 149. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386-87 (1914); see also supra notes 8-9 
and accompanying text (discussing Weeks). 
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are worth some expenditure of the public’s funds . . . .”150  Professor Del-
linger raised that point as an argument against any effort to replace the ex-
clusionary rule with a system of financial remedies.  The argument has 
even greater strength, however, when law enforcement personnel know the 
exact costs of violations in advance, can precisely evaluate those costs in 
individual cases, and can carefully include those costs in their financial 
planning. 
The second way in which we might use financial remedies to deter mis-
conduct is by increasing our reliance on punitive damages.  Under the law 
as it exists today, punitive damages are available in actions brought under § 
1983 or Bivens only if “the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated 
by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference 
to the federally protected rights of others.”151  When one examines the 
terms that the Herring Court used to describe the violations to which the 
exclusionary rule’s application is now limited (“flagrant,” “deliberate,” 
“patently unconstitutional,” “reckless,” and “grossly negligent”152) and 
compares them to the nouns and adjectives that the Court uses to describe 
the violations that warrant punitive damages (“evil motive or intent” and 
“reckless or callous indifference”153), one finds that while there are areas of 
overlap, there might also be spots of daylight between them.  If there are 
indeed gaps between the violations for which Herring permits application 
of the exclusionary rule and the violations for which punitive damages may 
be awarded, that gap ought to be closed.  The cases that the Court deems 
appropriate for the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effects today ought to be 
identical to the cases that are deemed appropriate for punitive damages’ de-
terrent effects in the absence of the exclusionary rule tomorrow. 
Of course, Professor Dellinger’s point applies here, too: we do not want 
law enforcement officers easily deciding that Fourth Amendment violations 
are worth their financial costs.  Yet the amount of punitive damages that a 
court might award in a given case could never be known with certainty in 
advance.  Law enforcement officers who were contemplating a Fourth 
Amendment violation thus would have good cause to worry that the costs 
of the violation might prove to be notably higher than they predict.  Due 
 
 150. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1563 (1972). 
 151. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (discussing § 1983); see also Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1980) (stating that punitive damages are available in Bivens ac-
tions).  Punitive damages may be awarded “even in the absence of actual damages.” Siebert 
v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 152. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701-02 (2009); see also supra notes 129-
134 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of Herring’s reasoning). 
 153. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56. 
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process principles require that the magnitude of punitive damages not be 
totally unforeseeable,154 but that still leaves courts with a great deal of flex-
ibility to fashion punitive-damage awards of varying magnitudes, taking 
account of such factors as “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct”155 and the civil and criminal penalties that the legislature has au-
thorized for “comparable misconduct.”156  If a defendant’s Fourth Amend-
ment violation is “flagrant,” “deliberate,” “patently unconstitutional,” 
“reckless,” or “grossly negligent,”157 then it ought to qualify for a deter-
rence-providing award of punitive damages. 
2. Increase Municipalities’ Financial Exposure for Fourth Amendment 
Violations Committed by Their Law Enforcement Officers 
There are two ways in which municipalities, counties, and other state 
subdivisions (which, for the sake of economy, I will refer to simply as mu-
nicipalities) are shielded today from significant liability for their law en-
forcement officers’ Fourth Amendment violations.  First, under Monell v. 
Department of Social Services of the City of New York,158 a municipality 
may be sued for damages under § 1983,159 but it can be held liable for the 
actions of its employees only if the employees were acting in accordance 
with the municipality’s policies or customs when they committed the mis-
 
 154. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (stating, with respect to pu-
nitive damages in civil actions, that “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our con-
stitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that 
will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may im-
pose”); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (rei-
terating this point). 
 155. BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 575 (identifying this as “the most important indicium of 
the reasonableness of a punitive damages award”).  
 156. Id. at 583.  One area of potential trouble for those seeking to replace the exclusio-
nary rule with increased reliance on punitive damages concerns the Court’s thinking regard-
ing the ratio of actual to punitive damages.  The Court indicated in State Farm that, although 
the Court has not yet adopted a bright-line test for assessing the relationship between actual 
damages and permissible punitive damages, “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio be-
tween punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.” 538 U.S. at 425.  The Court acknowledged, however, that it might be appropriate 
to deemphasize this concern when actual damages are nominal or small and the misconduct 
is egregious. See id. 
 157. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702; see also supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text 
(discussing this aspect of Herring’s reasoning). 
 158. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 159. See id. at 690 (“Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local gov-
ernment units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.”); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a cause of action against “every person” who violates 
another person’s federal rights under color of state law). 
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conduct.160  The Monell Court reasoned that unless a municipality’s em-
ployees were acting pursuant to the municipality’s policies or customs 
when they violated a person’s federal rights, the municipality itself was not 
the “moving force” behind the violation.161  When a municipal law en-
forcement officer violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights in a manner 
not contemplated by his or her employer’s policies or customs, therefore, 
the victim’s recourse under § 1983 is only against the individual officer.162 
Second, under City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,163 punitive dam-
ages cannot be imposed upon a municipality under § 1983 for the acts of its 
employees, even if those employees were acting in accordance with the 
municipality’s policies or customs when they committed the wrong-
doing.164  The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to abolish mu-
nicipalities’ historic immunity from punitive damages when it enacted § 
1983;165 that “[n]either reason nor justice” supports requiring taxpayers to 
foot the bill for punitive damages paid to plaintiffs who presumably have 
been fully compensated for their actual injuries;166 that individual city em-
ployees are unlikely to be deterred from violating a person’s federal rights 
by the knowledge that punitive damages might be inflicted upon their em-
 
 160. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“Congress did not intend municipalities to be held lia-
ble unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional 
tort.  In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it 
employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 
on a respondeat superior theory.”); id. at 694 (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s 
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fair-
ly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is 
responsible under § 1983.”); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) 
(“[A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself caus-
es the constitutional violation at issue.  Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not 
attach under § 1983.”). 
 161. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 
 162. See, e.g., Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 823 (6th Cir. 2005) (dismiss-
ing a § 1983 claim against a municipality because there was no “evidence of an unconstitu-
tional city policy pursuant to which [two officers] acted”); Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 
456 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a city could not be held liable under § 1983 for an “odd, 
isolated incident that was the first of its kind” in the city’s law enforcement department); 
Cosme v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. CV 09-2363-CAS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
105794, at *10-11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2009) (dismissing a § 1983 claim against a municipal-
ity because the plaintiff “does not purport to identify any policies, ordinances, regulations, 
customs or the like of the [municipality], the execution of which allegedly inflicted the con-
stitutional injuries about which he is complaining”). 
 163. 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 164. See id. at 271 (“Because absolute immunity from such damages obtained at common 
law and was undisturbed by the 42d Congress, and because that immunity is compatible 
with both the purposes of § 1983 and general principles of public policy, we hold that a mu-
nicipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). 
 165. See id. at 258-66 (examining the historical record). 
 166. Id. at 267. 
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ployers;167 that punitive damages are not needed in order to spur voters to 
hold city officials politically accountable for city employees’ wrong-
doings;168 and that deterrence is generally always best achieved by impos-
ing punitive damages on the very person who commits the wrongdoing.169 
Taken together, Monell and City of Newport greatly inhibit any effort to 
rely upon financial remedies as the primary deterrent against Fourth 
Amendment violations.  By restricting municipalities’ liability to compen-
satory damages, and by permitting even mere compensatory damages to be 
imposed upon a municipality only when a law enforcement officer commits 
a wrongdoing pursuant to official city policy or custom, the Court lamenta-
bly shuns the deterrence value of respondeat superior liability.  The threat 
of strict financial liability gives employers a powerful incentive to hire, 
train, and supervise their employees with great care.170  The Court has ac-
knowledged this point in other settings,171 and lower courts have done so as 
well.172  As Larry Kramer and Alan Sykes argued more than twenty years 
ago, § 1983 would yield far greater measures of deterrence against consti-
tutional wrongdoing by municipal employees—including wrongdoing by 
the many law enforcement officers whom municipalities employ—if those 
municipalities were more frequently held financially liable for their em-
ployees’ misconduct.173  Susanah Mead has made the same point, contend-
 
 167. See id. at 269 (stating that “the impact on the individual tortfeasor of this deterrence 
in the air is at best uncertain”). 
 168. See id. (concluding that “the compensatory damages that are available against a mu-
nicipality” are likely sufficient to provoke voters to hold officials politically accountable). 
 169. See id. at 270 (stating that “a damages remedy recoverable against individuals is 
more effective as a deterrent than the threat of damages against a government employer”). 
 170. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 188-89 (6th ed. 2003); cf. id. 
at 188 (stating that deterrence-focused financial disincentives are better placed on employers 
than on employees because “most employees lack the resources to pay a judgment if they 
injure someone seriously” and they thus “are not very responsive to the threat of tort liabili-
ty”). 
 171. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991) (stating that 
“[i]mposing exemplary damages on the corporation when its agent commits intentional 
fraud creates a strong incentive for the vigilance by those in a position ‘to guard substantial-
ly against the evil to be prevented’” and that holding employers strictly liable for their em-
ployees’ fraudulent activities “deters fraud more than a less stringent rule” (citation omit-
ted)). 
 172. See, e.g., Oki Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 298 F.3d 768, 776 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“This possibility of respondeat superior liability for an employee’s RICO violations 
encourages employers to monitor closely the activities of their employees to ensure that 
those employees are not engaged in racketeering.”); Brady v. Dairy Fresh Prods. Co., 974 
F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Respondeat superior liability . . . provides employers with 
an incentive to monitor employees and deter wrongful conduct.”). 
 173. See Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 287 (“To summarize: either strict vicarious 
liability or vicarious liability based on negligence is an improvement over personal liability 
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ing that “forcing municipalities to be responsible for their employees’ un-
constitutional conduct encourages care in the hiring, training, and supervi-
sion of municipal employees,” and that “[t]his care, in turn, should reduce 
the number of constitutional injuries.”174 
If a robust system of financial remedies is ever to render the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule unnecessary, either Congress or the Court 
will almost certainly have to either remove or soften the restrictions that 
Monell and City of Newport impose.  Although municipalities cannot con-
trol every act in which their law enforcement officers engage, they can do a 
great deal through their hiring, training, and shaping of departments’ inter-
nal culture to discourage violations of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.  
We ought to strengthen municipalities’ financial incentives to take those 
steps. 
3. Increase the Amount of Attorney’s Fees That May Be Recovered by 
Incarcerated Plaintiffs in Actions Brought Under § 1983 
Section 1983 provides individuals with a cause of action against persons 
who violate their Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law,175 and 
§ 1988 authorizes the prevailing party in a § 1983 action to recover his or 
her attorney’s fees from his or her opponent.176  A key provision of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PLRA”),177 however, caps the 
amount that may be awarded to a § 1983 plaintiff for attorney’s fees if he 
or she is incarcerated at the time he or she files the suit.  That statute pro-
vides, in pertinent part: 
(d)(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are autho-
rized under [42 U.S.C. § 1988], such fees shall not be awarded, except to 
the extent that— 
 
with respect to the efficiency of deterrent and precautionary measures to reduce the inci-
dence of constitutional torts.”); accord Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
2009, 2019 (1998) (arguing that imposing “respondeat superior liability for municipalities 
under § 1983 would better effectuate the . . . goal[] . . . of deterrence” because “municipali-
ties can adjust their recruitment, training, and supervision of agents; improve the quality or 
amount of data provided; and develop effective methods of sanctioning misconduct and re-
warding particular types of behavior”). 
 174. Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Be-
comes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REV. 517, 539 (1987). 
 175. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see also supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text 
(discussing Hudson’s acknowledgement that a damages remedy is available under § 1983 
for certain Fourth Amendment violations). 
 176. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006). 
 177. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
PETTYS_CHRISTENSEN2 6/13/2010  8:43 PM 
870 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual 
violation of the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute pursuant to 
which a fee may be awarded . . . . 
(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in 
paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall 
be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the de-
fendant.  If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of 
the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.178 
For our purposes here, that obtusely worded statute provides, in short, that 
attorney’s fees are capped at 150% of an incarcerated plaintiff’s monetary 
recovery in an action brought under § 1983.179 
If a person suffers a Fourth Amendment violation at the hands of a state 
official, and then is convicted of a crime and sentenced to a term of impri-
sonment, the PLRA makes it extraordinarily difficult for him or her to se-
cure effective legal representation for a § 1983 damages action.  Even set-
ting the PLRA aside, incarcerated plaintiffs already face an uphill climb to 
the extent that judges and juries find them to be unsympathetic litigants.180  
The PLRA makes matters untenably worse.  Assume, for example, that an 
incarcerated plaintiff proves that her Fourth Amendment rights were vi-
olated, but she cannot demonstrate that she suffered any compensable harm 
as a result.  Assume, further, that neither Congress nor the Court has yet 
adopted the proposal that punitive damages be made available in all cases 
to which the exclusionary rule today applies,181 and that the trial court has 
denied the plaintiff’s request for punitive damages in the case at bar.  The 
plaintiff in that case is likely to be awarded only a single dollar as nominal 
damages.182  What does the plaintiff’s attorney recover for his or her efforts 
to defend the nation’s Fourth Amendment values?  The lower courts have 
held that, in light of the restrictions imposed by the PLRA, the plaintiff’s 
attorney can recover no more than a mere $1.50.183  To state that fact is to 
make the argument: capping attorney’s fees for incarcerated plaintiffs at 
 
 178. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006). 
 179. See Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The statutory 
language may be inartful, but appellate courts have consistently interpreted the statute to 
limit a defendant’s liability for attorney fees to 150% of the money judgment.”); Royal v. 
Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Although awkwardly worded, the PLRA al-
lows an award of attorney fees for 150 percent of the damages award.”), cert. denied, 544 
U.S. 1061 (2005). 
 180. See Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. 
L. REV. 493, 500-01 (1955). 
 181. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 182. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 183. See, e.g., Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 742-44 (7th Cir. 2006); Robbins, 435 
F.3d at 1244; Royal, 375 F.3d at 726; Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 39-41 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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such an implausibly low level undercuts any effort to rely on damages ac-
tions as the primary means of deterring Fourth Amendment violations.  If 
the exclusionary rule is to become a relic of the past, the PLRA’s cap must 
be lifted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule infringes upon jurors’ moral 
right to see and hear all of the relevant, reasonably available evidence in 
the cases whose outcomes they have been asked to determine.  By exclud-
ing potentially powerful evidence of defendants’ guilt, the rule instrumen-
talizes jurors by treating them wholly as a means to the Court’s goal of de-
terring future Fourth Amendment violations.  Although exclusionary rules 
of all sorts are morally problematic,184 the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule is especially troublesome: deficiencies in jurors’ rational capacities 
play no role in justifying the evidence’s exclusion in the Fourth Amend-
ment setting; it is unreasonable to presume that jurors are willing to be 
yoked in service to the Court’s ends; the rule’s claim to democratic legiti-
macy is weaker than that of most other federal exclusionary rules; and the 
rule is not essential to achieving the deterrence objectives for which it was 
designed.185  Although there are a variety of ways in which we might try to 
address the rule’s infringement upon jurors’ deliberative autonomy,186 the 
best approach is probably to discard the exclusionary rule altogether and 
replace it with a set of financial remedies aimed at strongly discouraging 
Fourth Amendment violations.187 
Even without paying any regard to the exclusionary rule’s morally troub-
lesome treatment of jurors, the Court has already traveled quite some dis-
tance down the path toward abandoning the exclusionary rule.  In Hudson, 
for example, the Court indicated its belief that the risk of financial liability 
can supplant the need for the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effects in at least 
some instances,188 while in Herring the Court signaled its desire to restrict 
the exclusionary rule to the most egregious Fourth Amendment viola-
tions—violations for which qualified immunity is unlikely to succeed as a 
defense and for which the risk of financial exposure thus might provide a 
satisfactory measure of deterrence.189  The Court is unlikely to reject the 
exclusionary rule altogether, however, until the threat of financial liability 
 
 184. See supra Part I.A. 
 185. See supra Part I.B. 
 186. See supra Part II.A. 
 187. See supra Part II.B. 
 188. See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text (discussing Hudson). 
 189. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text (discussing Herring). 
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for Fourth Amendment violations has been made more robust.  Congress 
almost certainly must play a leading role in that effort.  After all, many of 
the existing obstacles to meaningful financial recovery are statutory in na-
ture—it is through its reading of § 1983, for example, that the Court has 
imposed various limits on plaintiffs’ ability to recover compensatory and 
punitive damages from law enforcement officers’ municipal employers,190 
and it is the PLRA that imposes a daunting cap on the ability of incarce-
rated plaintiffs to recover meaningful attorney’s fees when they prevail in § 
1983 actions.191 
Of course, the Court could help matters along by revisiting some of its 
prior statutory interpretations with an eye toward strengthening citizens’ 
ability to recover compensatory and punitive damages when law enforce-
ment officers violate their Fourth Amendment rights.  In 1978, for exam-
ple, the Court in Monell rejected seventeen-year-old precedent and held 
that there are instances when municipalities may be held liable for compen-
satory damages under § 1983.192  It is unlikely, however, that the Court will 
take comparable action today without any prompting from Congress.  Ab-
sent a compelling reason to believe that the Court misperceived Congress’s 
original intentions the first time around, a package of new statutory inter-
pretations runs the risk of appearing more legislative than judicial in nature.  
If Congress wishes to enact the legislative-reform package necessary to 
make the Court’s Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule a thing of the past, 
the Court has given us good reason to believe that it would be willing to go 
along.  But it likely does fall to Congress to take the next step. 
 
 190. See supra notes 158-169 and accompanying text (discussing Monell and City of 
Newport). 
 191. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the PLRA). 
 192. See Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (overruling 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)); see also supra notes 158-162 and accompanying text 
(discussing Monell). 
